what can’t be legitimately separated from how

I and co-authors have a chapter in the just published book “Care at the end of life” edited by Jeff Round. I haven’t had a chance to read most of it yet, but from I’ve seen so far it’s great.

Chris Sampson has a good chapter on the objects we value when examining the end-of-life trajectory. It’s nicely written and parts of it tie in with my series on “where next for discrete choice valuation”, parts one, (which he cites), two, three, but particularly (and too late for the book), four.

The issue concerns a better separation of what we are valuing from how we value it. I came at it from a slightly different angle from Chris, though I sense we’re trying to get people to address the same question. It’s of increasing importance now the ICECAP instruments are becoming more mainstream. I’m often thought of as “the valuation guy” – yet how we valued Capabilities is intimately tied up with how the measures might (or might not) be used, as well as the concepts behind them. When I became aware that the method we used – Case 2 BWS – would not necessarily have given us the same as those from discrete choice experiments, part of me worried…..briefly. But in truth, I honestly think our method is more in tune with the spirit of Sen’s ideas. (Not to mention the fact we seem to be getting similar estimates, though I explain why this is probably so in this instance previously).

I have said quite a bit already in the blogs, but it’s nice to see others also coming at this issue from other directions. Anybody working on developing the Capabilities Approach must remain in close contact with those who are working on valuation methods.